Creating and wasting fiscal space: Zambian fiscal performance 2002–2011 by Whitworth, Alan
	  	  
Following	  three	  decades	  of	  economic	  mismanagement	  and	  decline,	  Zambia	  has	  experienced	  sustained	  
economic	  growth	  since	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century.	  The	  combination	  of	  rapid	  growth,	  reduced	  public	  
expenditure,	  increased	  mining	  taxation	  and	  debt	  relief	  helped	  the	  Government	  establish	  fiscal	  
discipline	  and	  reduce	  fiscal	  deficits	  and	  debt	  to	  sustainable	  levels.	  As	  a	  result,	  fiscal	  space	  has	  grown	  
significantly	  and	  Zambia	  is	  no	  longer	  aid	  dependent.	  In	  addition,	  lower	  domestic	  public	  borrowing	  has	  
helped	  cut	  inflation	  and	  interest	  rates	  and	  has	  reduced	  crowding	  out	  of	  private	  sector	  borrowing.	  
These	  developments	  would	  normally	  be	  expected	  to	  lead	  to	  significant	  poverty	  reduction.	  However,	  by	  
2010	  there	  had	  been	  little	  improvement	  in	  poverty.	  This	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  fiscal	  space	  being	  wasted	  on	  
ill-­‐designed	  agriculture	  policies	  and	  uneconomic	  road	  paving	  projects	  of	  little	  benefit	  to	  the	  poor.	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Between	  the	  1970s	  and	  1990s	  Zambia’s	  economy	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  badly	  mismanaged	  in	  Africa.	  At	  the	  macro	  level	  this	  is	  perhaps	  best	  illustrated	  by	  the	  scale	  of	  fiscal	  deficits,	  which	  averaged	  12.3%	  of	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP)	  during	  the	  1970s,	  13.8%	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  6%	  in	  the	  1990s.	  With	  fiscal	  deficits	  and	  debt	  at	  unsustainable	  levels	  and	  copper	  production	  and	  prices	  in	  decline,	  per	  capita	  income	  fell	  substantially.	  But	  since	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  Zambia’s	  macro	  economy	  has	  been	  transformed.	  This	  briefs	  explains	  how	  this	  has	  been	  achieved,	  then	  explores	  the	  worrying	  signs	  that	  the	  potential	  benefits	  for	  poverty	  reduction	  are	  being	  lost	  through	  poor	  micro-­‐economic	  policies.	  
FISCAL	  TRENDS	  2002–2011	  The	  chart	  on	  page	  2	  of	  this	  brief	  shows	  that	  Zambia’s	  total	  revenue	  was	  fairly	  stable	  (at	  around	  17–18%	  of	  GDP)	  between	  2002	  and	  2008,	  dropped	  to	  16%	  in	  2009	  following	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  then	  rebounded	  to	  20.9%	  in	  2011.	  To	  understand	  
2
this	  pattern	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  examine	  the	  contrasting	  trends	  in	  non-­‐mining	  and	  mining	  revenue.	  	  Non-­‐mining	  revenue	  (tax	  and	  non-­‐tax)	  has	  been	  declining.	  Some	  of	  this	  is	  a	  result	  of	  Zambia	  honouring	  its	  commitments	  to	  reduce	  import	  taxes	  under	  regional	  trading	  agreements	  such	  as	  the	  SADC	  Trade	  Protocol.	  More	  of	  it	  is	  due	  to	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  tax	  exemptions	  to	  attract	  investment	  (e.g.	  Multi	  Facility	  Economic	  Zones)	  or	  to	  meet	  short-­‐term	  political	  objectives.	  An	  example	  of	  the	  latter	  was	  the	  cut	  in	  September	  2008	  of	  excise	  duties	  on	  petrol	  and	  diesel	  to	  offset	  the	  impact	  of	  rising	  world	  prices.	  	  This	  decline	  is	  more	  than	  offset	  by	  the	  increase	  in	  mining	  revenue.	  After	  a	  long	  period	  when	  it	  contributed	  little,	  total	  mining	  revenue	  (the	  combined	  value	  of	  mining	  tax	  and	  royalties)	  jumped	  sharply	  from	  1.9%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2010	  to	  5.5%	  in	  2011.	  As	  a	  result,	  total	  revenue	  jumped	  from	  17.8%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2010	  to	  20.9%	  –	  the	  highest	  level	  this	  century.	  Although	  the	  2011	  figure	  is	  distorted	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Debt	  and	  interest	  While	  public	  attention	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  reduction	  in	  foreign	  debt	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Zambia	  reaching	  HIPC	  Completion	  Point	  in	  2005,	  domestic	  interest	  was	  much	  larger	  than	  foreign	  interest	  throughout	  the	  period,	  and	  reductions	  in	  this	  domestic	  debt	  have	  been	  more	  significant	  in	  cutting	  the	  GRZ	  interest	  bill.	  	  Foreign	  interest	  fell	  from	  1.3%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2002	  to	  0.1%	  in	  2011.	  Domestic	  interest	  fell	  even	  more,	  from	  2.8%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2002	  to	  1.1%	  in	  2011.	  	  	  While	  the	  reduction	  in	  foreign	  interest	  is	  almost	  entirely	  attributable	  to	  debt	  relief,	  domestic	  interest	  savings	  are	  due	  to	  three	  distinct	  factors:	  (1)	  lower	  borrowing	  resulting	  from	  improved	  fiscal	  management	  from	  2004,	  (2)	  GDP	  growth,	  and	  (3)	  falling	  interest	  rates.	  Zambia	  has	  experienced	  a	  ‘virtuous	  circle’	  of	  lower	  borrowing	  facilitating	  lower	  interest	  rates,	  leading	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  interest	  bill	  which	  in	  turn	  facilitates	  further	  reductions	  in	  borrowing,	  inflation	  and	  interest	  rates,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Another	  important	  benefit	  of	  reduced	  GRZ	  borrowing	  is	  the	  impact	  on	  “crowding	  out”	  of	  the	  private	  sector.	  When	  governments	  borrow	  domestically	  to	  finance	  fiscal	  deficits	  they	  both	  reduce	  the	  supply	  of	  finance	  available	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  increase	  its	  cost	  (the	  interest	  rate).	  This	  discourages	  private	  investment	  and	  growth.	  Conversely,	  when	  government	  borrowing	  is	  reduced	  interest	  rates	  are	  likely	  to	  fall	  and	  private	  sector	  borrowing	  increase.	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by	  a	  ‘one	  off’	  payment	  of	  arrears	  (1.9%	  of	  GDP),	  the	  doubling	  of	  the	  royalty	  rate	  on	  base	  metals	  to	  6%	  in	  the	  2012	  Budget	  means	  that	  total	  mining	  revenue	  is	  unlikely	  to	  return	  to	  the	  previous	  low	  levels.	  While	  there	  is	  still	  controversy	  over	  the	  appropriate	  mineral	  tax	  regime	  for	  Zambia,	  a	  decade	  after	  privatisation	  the	  mining	  sector	  has	  finally	  become	  a	  significant	  source	  of	  GRZ	  revenue.	  	  
The	  end	  of	  aid	  dependency	  For	  much	  of	  its	  history	  Zambia	  has	  been	  dependent	  on	  foreign	  aid	  to	  supplement	  GRZ	  revenue.	  During	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  aid	  dependent	  countries	  in	  the	  world.	  However,	  aid’s	  fiscal	  significance	  has	  diminished	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  Locally	  collected	  data	  is	  poor,	  but	  according	  to	  OECD	  figures,	  aid’s	  share	  of	  GDP	  declined	  sharply	  from	  21.9%	  in	  2002	  to	  5.4%	  in	  2011.	  This	  largely	  reflects	  the	  rapid	  growth	  in	  GDP	  since	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  and	  is	  exaggerated	  by	  the	  sharp	  appreciation	  of	  the	  kwacha–US	  dollar	  exchange	  rate	  in	  2006.	  With	  GDP	  expected	  to	  continue	  growing	  faster	  than	  aid	  over	  the	  medium	  term,	  the	  ratio	  is	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  fall.	  In	  short,	  Zambia	  is	  no	  longer	  aid	  dependent.	  	  
The	  end	  of	  unsustainable	  deficits	  Between	  2002	  and	  2004	  there	  was	  a	  serious	  effort	  to	  reduce	  expenditure	  and	  the	  deficit,	  which	  dropped	  from	  6%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2003	  to	  2.9%	  in	  2004.	  The	  deficit	  continued	  to	  decline,	  reaching	  a	  healthy	  1.6%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2006.	  So,	  by	  reducing	  expenditure	  –	  and	  assisted	  by	  rapid	  growth	  in	  GDP	  (the	  denominator)	  –	  it	  took	  just	  three	  years	  for	  the	  GRZ	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  decades	  of	  unsustainable	  deficits.	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FISP	  Since	  2002	  the	  Farmer	  Input	  Support	  Programme	  (FISP,	  formerly	  known	  as	  the	  Fertiliser	  Support	  Programme)	  has	  received	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  agricultural	  budget	  aimed	  at	  poverty	  reduction.	  GRZ	  procures	  fertiliser	  and	  seed	  and	  sells	  it	  to	  smallholder	  farmers	  at	  subsidised	  rates.	  However,	  the	  scheme	  has	  been	  plagued	  by	  a	  number	  of	  problems.	  First,	  the	  delivery	  of	  FISP	  inputs	  to	  farmers	  is	  frequently	  delayed.	  Second,	  FISP	  inputs	  are	  targeted	  at	  and	  disproportionately	  captured	  by	  a	  small	  minority	  of	  larger,	  wealthier	  farmers.	  Third,	  the	  standardised	  FISP	  input	  pack	  is	  not	  appropriate	  for	  many	  of	  Zambia’s	  diverse	  soil	  and	  agro-­‐ecological	  systems.	  Subsidising	  inappropriate	  inputs	  leads	  to	  maize	  mono-­‐cropping	  and	  low	  yields.	  Fourth,	  GRZ	  direct	  procurement	  of	  fertiliser	  has	  crowded	  out	  private	  agro-­‐dealers	  in	  some	  regions.	  Despite	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  evidence	  that	  it	  has	  helped	  reduce	  rural	  poverty,	  expenditure	  on	  FISP	  increased	  from	  0.5%	  of	  GDP	  (2.4%	  of	  domestic	  expenditure)	  in	  2005	  to	  1.0%	  of	  GDP	  (4.1%	  of	  expenditure)	  in	  2011.	  
FRA	  maize	  purchase	  The	  Food	  Reserve	  Agency	  (FRA)	  is	  mandated	  to	  maintain	  strategic	  food	  reserves	  to	  ensure	  food	  security	  in	  the	  event	  of	  poor	  harvests.	  It	  also	  purchases	  surplus	  maize	  at	  guaranteed	  prices	  from	  smallholder	  farmers.	  Until	  2010	  these	  operations	  cost	  between	  0.1%	  and	  0.4%	  of	  GDP	  (1%–2%	  of	  domestic	  expenditure),	  but	  the	  bill	  shot	  up	  in	  2010	  and	  2011.	  Good	  rains	  saw	  a	  record	  harvest	  in	  2010,	  which,	  combined	  with	  a	  guaranteed	  price	  way	  above	  market	  rates	  that	  meant	  the	  FRA	  ended	  up	  purchasing	  most	  of	  the	  marketed	  surplus,	  saw	  the	  maize	  bill	  balloon	  to	  1.6%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2010.	  Although	  the	  rains	  were	  less	  good	  in	  2011,	  Zambia	  had	  a	  second	  successive	  record	  maize	  harvest,	  partly	  because	  farmers	  switched	  from	  other	  crops	  into	  maize	  in	  response	  to	  guaranteed	  above-­‐market	  prices.	  With	  an	  election	  due	  in	  September	  2011,	  the	  government	  was	  reluctant	  to	  reduce	  the	  guaranteed	  price	  or	  restrict	  FRA	  purchases.	  As	  a	  result,	  FRA’s	  maize	  purchase	  bill	  increased	  still	  further	  to	  1.8%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2011.	  If	  these	  subsidies	  to	  maize	  producers	  were	  clearly	  benefitting	  the	  poor	  they	  might	  be	  justified	  despite	  the	  damage	  to	  GRZ	  finances	  and	  private	  traders.	  However,	  “the	  benefits	  of	  the	  FRA	  maize	  support	  prices	  are	  disproportionately	  enjoyed	  by	  the	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HOW	  HAS	  FISCAL	  SPACE	  
BEEN	  USED?	  Now	  it	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  make	  real	  decisions	  on	  resources,	  how	  has	  it	  chosen	  to	  allocate	  them?	  	  As	  a	  backdrop,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Zambia’s	  impressive	  growth	  performance	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  had	  relatively	  little	  impact	  on	  poverty.	  “The	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  falling	  below	  the	  poverty	  line	  reduced	  from	  62.8%	  in	  2006	  to	  60.5%	  in	  2010”	  (GRZ	  2012).	  	  While	  analysis	  of	  fiscal	  space	  is	  an	  imprecise	  science	  and	  should	  be	  treated	  with	  caution,	  the	  figures	  suggest	  that	  most	  of	  the	  fiscal	  space	  created	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  been	  spent	  on	  three	  programmes,	  each	  of	  which	  represents	  an	  inefficient	  use	  of	  resources	  with	  little	  impact	  on	  poverty	  reduction:	  (1)	  fertiliser	  subsidies,	  (2)	  maize	  purchase,	  and	  (3)	  paving	  roads.	  	  
Fiscal	  space	  and	  the	  discretionary	  
balance	  By	  showing	  trends	  in	  total	  domestic	  expenditure	  as	  a	  share	  of	  GDP,	  the	  chart	  below	  illustrates	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  GRZ	  “discretionary	  balance”–	  i.e.	  that	  part	  of	  the	  budget	  over	  which	  GRZ	  can	  exercise	  real	  control,	  or	  the	  part	  not	  represented	  by	  wages,	  interest	  and	  repayment	  of	  arrears.	  It	  is	  a	  useful	  indicator	  of	  “fiscal	  space”.	  Taking	  the	  discretionary	  balance	  as	  an	  approximation	  of	  fiscal	  space,	  fiscal	  space	  increased	  by	  4.9%	  of	  GDP	  between	  2002	  and	  2011.	  Given	  that	  real	  GDP	  itself	  grew	  by	  75%	  over	  the	  period,	  this	  represents	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  resources	  available	  to	  GRZ.	  Following	  some	  30	  years	  during	  which	  it	  had	  negligible	  control	  over	  its	  own	  expenditure,	  GRZ	  finally	  has	  significant	  fiscal	  space	  at	  its	  disposal.	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relatively	  large	  farmers	  over	  5	  hectares,	  even	  though	  they	  constitute	  only	  3.8%	  of	  the	  smallholder	  farm	  population”,	  while	  most	  Zambians	  who	  are	  net	  maize	  purchasers	  lose	  through	  paying	  higher	  prices	  (Jayne	  et	  al.	  2011).	  
Paving	  roads	  The	  third	  area	  to	  experience	  substantially	  increased	  expenditure	  in	  recent	  years	  is	  road	  upgrading.	  Following	  decades	  of	  neglect,	  Zambia	  has	  a	  large	  backlog	  of	  maintenance	  and	  rehabilitation,	  mainly	  on	  the	  unpaved	  road	  network.	  While	  funding	  for	  maintenance	  has	  increased	  somewhat,	  most	  additional	  GRZ	  funding	  has	  been	  addressed	  not	  at	  the	  backlog	  but	  at	  upgrading	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  the	  unpaved	  network	  to	  fully	  engineered	  paved	  standard;	  upgrading	  expenditure	  increased	  from	  0.1%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2005	  to	  1.6%	  in	  2011.	  Few	  of	  these	  projects	  have	  sufficient	  traffic	  potential	  to	  be	  economically	  viable.	  Decisions	  were	  taken	  at	  the	  political	  level	  with	  little,	  if	  any,	  technical/economic	  appraisal.	  Paving	  roads	  is	  of	  little	  benefit	  to	  the	  poor	  and	  is	  crowding	  out	  funding	  for	  maintenance	  and	  rehabilitation	  of	  the	  unpaved	  network	  –	  activities	  with	  much	  better	  economics	  and	  benefitting	  far	  more	  poor	  people.	  	  The	  table	  below	  compares	  the	  growth	  in	  expenditure	  on	  the	  above	  three	  programmes	  (as	  shares	  of	  GDP)	  with	  growth	  in	  the	  discretionary	  balance	  for	  the	  periods	  2005	  to	  2010	  and	  2005	  to	  2011.	  Over	  the	  former	  period	  their	  combined	  growth	  in	  expenditure	  accounted	  for	  2.2%	  out	  of	  the	  2.5%	  of	  GDP	  increase	  in	  the	  discretionary	  balance,	  while	  in	  the	  latter	  period	  they	  accounted	  for	  3.6%	  out	  of	  4.4%.	  This	  suggests	  that	  instead	  of	  utilising	  the	  fiscal	  space	  created	  in	  recent	  years	  to	  reduce	  poverty,	  GRZ	  has	  wasted	  most	  of	  it	  on	  programmes	  of	  little	  benefit	  to	  the	  poor.	  	  
Growth	  as	  %	  of	  GDP:	  
	   2005–2010	   2005–2011	  
Discretionary	  
balance	  
2.5%	   4.4%	  
of	  which:	   	   	  
	  	  	  FISP	   0.3%	   0.5%	  
	  	  	  FRA	   1.4%	   1.6%	  
	  	  	  Road	  paving	   0.5%	   1.5%	  
	  	  	  Sub-­‐total	   2.2%	   3.6%	  
Notes:	  For	  full	  references	  and	  sources	  refer	  to	  the	  full-­‐length	  paper:	  Creating	  and	  wasting	  fiscal	  space:	  
Zambian	  fiscal	  performance,	  2002–2011	  by	  Alan	  Whitworth	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CONCLUSION	  The	  Zambian	  macro	  economy	  has	  been	  transformed	  since	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century.	  Following	  decades	  as	  a	  macro-­‐economic	  “pariah	  state”,	  Zambia	  has	  become	  a	  model	  of	  fiscal	  management.	  	  The	  fiscal	  transformation	  is	  largely	  explained	  by	  three	  distinct	  developments:	  (1)	  mining	  revenues	  have	  begun	  to	  make	  a	  significant	  contribution,	  (2)	  economic	  growth	  has	  reduced	  the	  pain”	  required	  to	  bring	  down	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  and	  deficit-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratios,	  and	  (3)	  reduced	  domestic	  borrowing,	  assisted	  by	  debt	  relief,	  has	  led	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  interest	  by	  2.9%	  of	  GDP	  over	  the	  period.	  The	  combined	  effect	  of	  these	  developments	  was	  that	  GRZ’s	  “discretionary	  balance”	  (fiscal	  space)	  increased	  by	  4.9%	  of	  GDP	  between	  2002	  and	  2011.	  With	  real	  GDP	  growing	  by	  75%	  over	  the	  period,	  this	  represents	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  resources.	  	  In	  a	  context	  of	  sustained	  growth	  and	  macro-­‐economic	  stability,	  the	  creation	  of	  substantial	  fiscal	  space	  means	  that	  GRZ	  has	  an	  unprecedented	  opportunity	  to	  use	  public	  expenditure	  to	  make	  inroads	  into	  poverty.	  Having	  had	  negligible	  fiscal	  space	  for	  decades,	  GRZ	  has	  little	  experience	  or	  expertise	  in	  the	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  public	  resources.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  not	  surprising,	  therefore,	  that	  recently	  created	  fiscal	  space	  appears	  so	  far	  to	  have	  been	  largely	  wasted	  on	  inefficient	  agriculture	  subsidies	  and	  uneconomic	  road	  paving	  projects	  which	  –	  while	  notionally	  aimed	  at	  poverty	  reduction	  –	  are	  of	  little	  benefit	  to	  the	  poor.	  Having	  finally	  mastered	  macro-­‐economic	  management,	  if	  the	  rewards	  are	  not	  to	  be	  dissipated,	  GRZ	  needs	  to	  turn	  its	  attention	  to	  micro-­‐economic	  policy	  and	  expenditure	  management.	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